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JURISDICTION
This matter
divorce

case.

involves an appeal from a District Court
Accordingly,

the

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(h).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court properly award Respondent a

future interest in a Defined Benefit Retirement Plan following
a post-trial hearing which was but one in a series of post-trial
hearings, all heard and decided before the entry of the Decree?
At trial, the Court, divided the cash retirement plans of both
parties, along with other property that had ascertainable cash
values.

The issue of possible unknown retirement rights was

reserved at trial, and later argued and decided on October 31,
2005.

The issue was addressed at trial on April 23, 2004

(Record, p. 1019; Apr. 23, 2004 Tr. at 19-20), and in subsequent
hearings on December 9, 2004 (Record, p. 1020; Dec. 9, 2004 Tr.
at 53-56) and October 31, 2005, (Record, p. 1021; October 31,
2005 Tr. at 23-47).

A trial court's property distribution in a

divorce decree will not be overturned by the Appellate Court
except for abuse of discretion, which did not occur in the
instant case.

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P2d 1076, 1078 (Utah

1988).

1

2.

Although a Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered,

it was actually entered the same date as the Decree of Divorce
(August 28, 2006).

Regardless of how the document was titled,

it really was not a Supplemental Decree nor was it a nunc pro
tunc order, but was part of the final Decree, and the Court was
consistent in dividing all of the retirement funds as of the
trial date.

No legal error occurred, and using the trial date

as the date for division of property is within the discretion of
the Court.
3.

The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel claimed by the

Appellant does not apply to this case because there was no prior
judicial proceeding.
hearings

This matter consists of a series of

in the same case over a lengthy period of time,

culminating in a Decree and Supplemental Decree signed the same
date, in August 2006.

Judicial Estoppel deals with situations

where the same parties are involved in two different cases.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This Appeal challenges the division of Petitioner's Defined
Benefit Pension Plan, the existence of which was alleged at the
Trial.

Petitioner did not know such a plan existed, but

consented to divide any plan later discovered.

The issues of

whether such a plan existed and how to divide it were raised at
the Trial in April 2004 and a series of hearings thereafter,
culminating in a hearing in October 2005, when the Trial Judge
2

heard argument and divided

the plan pursuant to Woodward.

Finally, in August 2006, the Court signed a Decree, Findings,
and a Supplemental Decree, all on the same date, ordering the *
plan divided.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement on Pages 2 and
3 of the Appellant's Brief regarding the course of proceedings,
and incorporates Appellant's Exhibits "A" (copy of UCA 30-3-5,
"B" (Decree of Divorce), "C" (Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law), "D" (Supplemental Decree of Divorce), and "F" (Motion
with attachments), and will refer to those exhibits throughout
this Brief.
Additionally, however, the trial court held a hearing on
October 31, 2005 (Record, p. 1021; Tr. of October 31, 2005, at
23-47; Exhibit "A" to this Brief) where the parties argued the
issue of dividing the Defined Benefit Retirement Plan which had
been discovered by that time.

The Court made findings in that

hearing upon which the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was based.
Pages 23-49 of that hearing transcript are attached to this
Brief as Exhibit "A".
Also, due to the protracted nature of this case, the trial
court bifurcated the proceedings and entered an Order of Divorce
on December 16, 2004 (Record, p. 538).
This Appeal resulted.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the April 2004 Trial, the Court discussed the various
retirement accounts of the parties.

In its April 23, 2004

ruling, the Court totaled up four retirement accounts owned by
the Petitioner/Appellee and three retirement accounts owned by
the Respondent/Appellant, and awarded Petitioner a difference of
$17,762 (Record, p. 1019; April 23, 2004 Transcript, P.21). The
Court's Findings of Fact

(Exhibit "C", Appellant's Opening

Brief; Record, p. 968), at Paragraphs 68 and 69, as well as the
identical provisions of the Decree of Divorce (Exhibit "B",
Appellant's Opening Brief; Record, p. 990), at Paragraphs 40 and
41, found and ordered that all of those referenced accounts were
"definitive cash amounts".

The Court's statement, which the

Appellant characterizes as a Finding, is found at Page 1019 of
the Record, April 23, 2004, Transcript, Pages 19 and 20:
"THE COURT: That's okay. With regard to retirement
there are a couple of exhibits I want to have in front of me as
we discuss through retirement. I think it will be healthiest
for both parties if we split of the retirement as opposed to
ordering a Woodward share to the extent we have knowledge and
ability to do that.
So if we go to Exhibit G of the petitioner. Then for
the respondent there were actually a couple places where that
came up. It's both on his Exhibit 1, which is kind of the his
master exhibit, and then on his Exhibit 7. It came in those two
places. Here is my best view of this. We've stipulated that
there is going to be a review of this T-Mobile account. And if
there is value there then there will be credit placed on the
petitioner's side with regard to the T-Mobile retirement.
My best view then in addition to that is that the
petitioner's retirement consists of $18,166.98 with the Delta
Family Care Savings Plan, $3,502.16 with American General
Financial, $2,340.80 with the Delta Sky Share Stock and
$5,607.32 with American Scandia Annuity for a total of
$29,617.26. And then you'll have to add to that any T-Mobile."
(Record, p. 1019; April 23, 2004 Tr. at 19:18-25; 20:1-13).
(emphasis added).
4

Respondent claimed Petitioner had a T-Mobile retirement
account, and the Court ruled that a credit would be placed on
the Petitioner's side if such an account was later discovered.
As it turned out, there was no such thing as a T-Mobile
retirement.
The Findings, Paragraph 72, provide as follows (Record, p.
968; Exhibit "C" of Appellant's Opening Brief):
"72. The Court finds that, based upon the agreement
of the parties, if the Petitioner has additional retirement with
Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be entitled to a
credit for his one-half (1/2) interest.
The Respondent
represented that he sent a subpoena requesting the records."
(emphasis added)
The parallel paragraph in the Decree of Divorce, Paragraph
36 of the Decree, states in its entirety as follows (Record, p.
990; Exhibit "B" of Appellant's Opening Brief):
"36. The Court orders that, based upon the agreement
of the parties, if the Petitioner has additional retirement with
Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be entitled to a
credit for his one-half (1/2) interest.
The Respondent
represented that he sent a subpoena requesting the records. The
Court has addressed this item in the Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce." (emphasis added)
Appellant's counsel signed the Findings and the Decree
'Approved as to Form'.
In

his

Statement

of

Facts

(Page

3,

Opening

Brief),

Appellant states that Respondent was found to have interests in
three retirement accounts, including a small Defined Benefit
Plan.
that

This statement appears to be erroneous; the Court found
Respondent

had

retirement accounts.

"definitive

cash

amounts"

in

three

(Findings of Fact, Paragraph 69; Decree of
5

Divorce, Paragraph 41.) Counsel has not found any reference in
the Record or the Findings to any Defined Benefit Plan except
for the one owned by Petitioner, confirmed after the Trial and
discussed at length on October 31, 2005

(Record, p. 1021;

Exhibit "A" to this Brief; Tr of October 31, 2005, pages 23-47).
The Court's finding at the April 2004 Trial was that it
would be best if the seven known retirement accounts, which were
all

cash

accounts,

be

divided

as

part

of

the

property

settlement. The Court divided them as cash, allowing each party
to keep their respective accounts and making up the difference
in a global property division.

The Court decided that any

after-discovered account of the Petitioner would be divided, but
the Court assumed any such account would be a cash account
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005
Tr., p. 44, 20-25; p. 45, 1-14).
By the time of the December 9, 2004 hearing (Record, Page
1020; December 9, 2004 Tr. p. 53-56), the parties were still
waiting for information regarding either a T-Mobile Retirement
Account or a Delta Retirement Account. As the record indicates,
the argument was over whether there had been a roll-over of the
account, and whether the same account was being added twice to
Petitioner's

retirement

rights.

The Court

stated

that a

judgment would be entered for Respondent in the amount of onehalf, and the issue would be addressed in some sort of judgment
(Record, p. 1020; December 9, 2004, Tr., p.55, 14-16; p.56, 36).

Although Petitioner's counsel stated they would be happy to
6

give credit if another account was found, the Court actually
concluded that there would be a judgment granted if one were
found.
By this time, it was apparent the matter would not be
resolved soon, so the Court bifurcated the proceedings and
granted an Order of Divorce (reserving all other issues) which
was entered on December 16, 2004 (Record, p. 538).
Also on December 9, 2004, the Court resolved the issue of
completing the previously ordered property settlement. Although
there was not yet any actual order signed and entered, the Court
made a verbal order at the April 2004 Trial, which
Respondent to pay Petitioner approximately $106,000.

required
At the

December 9, 2004 hearing, the parties discussed and presented
arguments regarding how and when Mr. Lamano would pay Mrs.
Lamano that sum, and ultimately the Court stated, at Page 46 of
the Transcript, as follows:
"THE COURT: So what we are contemplating then is another
provision somewhat similar to Paragraph 74. I mean, you're
probably looking still at a 45- to 90-day time frame for these
things, and then a judgment entering, if nothing has happened in
that period of time." (December 9, 2004 Tr., p. 46, 13-18).
Thereafter, Respondent made payments

to Petitioner of

$39,340.61 on March 25, 2005, and $62,478.24 on May 11, 2005
towards the amount due from him for the property settlement
order.

See the Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Motions

for Judgment Regarding Medical Bills and Judgment Regarding
Property Equalization Balance (Record, p. 927).
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It was ultimately discovered that Petitioner had a Defined
Benefit Plan called the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan, and
no T-Mobile

account was ever discovered

(Record, p. 1021;

Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005, Tr. p. 23-47).
The Court held a hearing October 31, 2005, to consider how
to deal with Petitioner's Defined Benefit Plan.

The Court

concluded that no further hearing would be necessary and divided
that plan according to the Woodward formula.

The division was

made effective April 20, 2004, the date of the Trial and the
date of the property division.

As stated in the Supplemental

Decree of Divorce (Record, p. 915; Exhibit "D", Appellant's
Opening Brief), this division date was consistent with the other
retirement divisions made by the Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Supplemental Decree of Divorce, entered the same date
as the Decree and Findings, awarded the Respondent his Woodward
Share of the Petitioner's Defined Benefit Retirement Plan. All
the other retirement plans were cash accounts, and the Trial
Court did not abuse its discretion in differentiating a Defined
Benefit Plan from cash retirement plans.

Although there were

proffers by the Petitioner at the trial and on December 9, 2004
agreeing to give credit for any after-discovered plan, and
statements by the Court that either credit or a judgment would
be granted, there was no final order or any definitive finding
based on known facts until October 31, 2005.
8

In any event, the

Court is not bound to accept stipulations of the parties.

The

Trial Court did not error in refusing to hold that Petitioner
was estopped from changing her position.
The Respondent's Woodward interest in Petitioner's Defined
Benefit Plan was properly determined as of the trial date. All
the other property was divided as of that date. The trial date
is

the

date

upon which

the

Court

should

normally

divide

property.
The Court's Decrees and Orders should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
I.
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION OCCURRED REGARDING
DIVISION OF RETIREMENT RIGHTS.
A.
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO AWARD RESPONDENT A
WOODWARD INTEREST OF A DEFINED BENEFIT RETIREMENT PLAN, AND IT
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE SETTING
OFF A DEFINED BENEFIT RETIREMENT PLAN INTEREST AGAINST THE
PROPERTY DIVISION.
At Trial, the Court divided the cash assets of the parties,
including

the

known

retirement

accounts.

The

retirement

accounts were, in essence, divided equally, by awarding each
party his or her funds and then calculating the difference as an
amount owed by Mr. Lamano to Mrs. Lamano, since the total of his
cash accounts was larger.
Technically, the Woodward formula was used, because that
case allows the courts to divide retirement funds or retirement
rights accumulated during the marriage as property.

If the

entire fund or right was accumulated during the marriage, and if
9

it is a cash account, then the division is normally one-half to
each party, which is what occurred here.

If future, post-

divorce retirement accumulations are anticipated, such as is the
case with a Defined Benefit Plan, then a formula is used which,
in effect, awards the owner of the plan 100% of the accumulation
after the date of trial, but divides equally that portion
accumulated during the marriage.
The determination of retirement rights and the application
of a formula to those rights is entirely within the discretion
of the Court.
In the instant case, Respondent alleged at trial and
continued

to allege

hearings,

that

revealed.

thereafter,

Petitioner

had

at a series of

a plan which

had

follow-up
not been

In effect, at the Trial in April 2004 the Court

reserved ruling on that issue pending further discovery, and
such was still the status of the matter at the December 9, 2004
hearing.
By the time of the hearing on October 31, 2005, the
respondent

had

received

information,

through

a

subpoena,

establishing the existence of Petitioner's Defined Benefit Plan.
Petitioner did not know of the existence of the plan.

As the

proffered evidence at the October 31, 2005 hearing established,
the plan was entirely funded by petitioner's employer, Delta
Airlines, and petitioner made no contributions thereto.
Furthermore, as it turns out the Respondent was only half
correct about Petitioner having another plan.
10

Apparently at

Trial Respondent claimed that Petitioner had a plan known as TMobile, and it turns out there was no such plan, although
Respondent's inquiries did ultimately result in locating a Delta
Family Plan.
The Court reserved the issue of what to do with any later
disclosed or discovered retirement plan at trial, reserved that
issue again at the hearing on December 9, 2004, and then
resolved the issue at the October 31, 2005 hearing.
Respondent's counsel admitted that the issue had been
reserved when, at the October 31, 2005 hearing, he stated:
"MR. SMITH:
I think we—I'm not asking to reopen the
trial, because my understanding is this particular issue has
always been sort of held open. But, yes, I think—in order to
deal with this asset fairly, I think you—you're going to have
to take some supplemental evidence and have some supplemental
findings."
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; Tr.
October 31, 2005, p. 37, 1-7).
Even though the three documents ultimately signed in August
2006 were styled as a Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree, in reality they were
part and parcel of the same ultimate decision.

The Decree of

Divorce entered in August 2006 purports to divorce the parties,
even though they were actually divorced in December 2004.

The

Decree of Divorce refers to the Supplemental Decree signed the
same date in August 2006.

(Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 36.)

Given the fact that two years and four months elapsed
between the Trial and the Court finally signing written orders,
it is understandable that the parties and counsel were in all
likelihood happy to have anything signed, and didn't want to
11

risk spending several more months correcting the Decree to
clarify that the parties had already been divorced, and folding
the provisions of the Supplemental Decree into the Decree and
Findings, which would have required additional redrafting of all
documents.
Thus, the Defined Benefit Plan was discovered and the
parties argued the disposition of the same before the Court,
prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, as part of a
continuing process involving a series of hearings, and after the
respondent had paid petitioner $100,000 of the $106,000 that he
owed her as part of the Court ordered property division (Record,
p. 927).
The Court properly decided that the Defined Benefit Plan
was not amenable to division and cash offset because it's
current value could not be accurately determined, nor would a
judgment in favor of Respondent have been equitable, so the
Court applied the Woodward formula (Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A"
to this Brief; October 31, 2005 Tr. p. 47, 1-12).
Respondent's own proffer at the October 31, 2005 hearing
established that Mrs. Lamano's Defined Benefit Retirement was
not a cash account, would not begin paying until October 1,
2019,

would

only

pay

monthly

payments

for

Mrs. Lamano's

lifetime, was a Defined Benefit Plan entirely funded by the
employer without any employee contributions, and the owner of
the plan, Delta Airlines, did not make any calculations as to
present value (Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief;
12

October 31, 2005 Tr. p. 25, 22-5; p. 26, 1-19).

(Also, see

Exhibit "F", Appellant's Opening Brief, Delta letter of March
17, 2005.)
Mr. Lamano's other proffered exhibit at the October 31,
2005 hearing, a letter from an actuary, was based upon unaudited
information provided apparently by Mr. Lamano (Record, p. 987;
Exhibit "F", Appellant's Opening Brief, letter of April 22,
2005).

A present value was stated as of May 1, 2005, based

upon mortality tables and a projected interest rate. Both these
are just guesses.
benefit

payable

The letter also states that the ultimate

from

any

Defined

Benefit

Plan

is heavily

dependent upon participant's earnings in the future (the years
immediately preceding retirement), and then proceeded to take
into account unknown future salary increases, again providing
merely a guess.
The Court considered the following factors in reaching its
decision:
1.

The proffered letter from Delta dated March 17, 2005.

2.

The other (cash) retirements were divided as of the

trial date, and the Court had "hard numbers' upon which to base
that decision

(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief;

October 31, 2005 Tr., p. 28, 24-25; p. 29, 1-6).
3.

The animosity between the parties, which dictated

dividing property as cleanly as possible

(Record, p. 1021;

Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005 Tr., p. 29, 1-6).
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4.

The fact that the "cash" property division had already

been accomplished (Record, p. 1021, Exhibit "A" to this Brief;
October 31, 2005 Tr., p. 32, 16-25; p. 33, 1-19).
5.

The Defined Benefit Plan was not easily divisible

(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005
Tr., p. 34, 19-25; p. 35, 1-9; p. 36; 4-6).
6.

The Defined Benefit Plan was not a cash account, and

attempting to assign a cash value presented too many "variables"
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005
Tr., p. 37, 14-25; p. 38, 1-6 and line 25; p. 39, 1-11; p. 41,
12-23 and line 25; p. 42, 1-6).
The Trial Court decided that using the Woodward formula was
the most equitable method of dividing that particular account
because it was not a cash account and a formula was the best way
to deal with future uncertainties.

In Bailey v. Bailey, 745

P. 2d 830 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this court stated that the
distribution

of

retirement

benefits

should

generally

be

postponed until the benefits are received or at least until the
earner is eligible to retire.

Also see Woodward v. Woodward/

656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).

B.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE ANY
STIPULATION, AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO DO SO.
Mr. Lamano urges the Court to find that there was actually
a stipulation between the parties regarding division of the
unknown retirement plan. Although that might be considered the
14

case, based upon Trial counsel's statement, there is no evidence
that the Court accepted any stipulation regarding the retirement
plans.

Stipulations of parties in divorce cases serve only as

recommendations to the Court.

See Jones v. Jones, P. 2d 222

(Utah, 1943).
An agreement or stipulation between parties in a divorce
case is not binding upon the Court, but serves only as a
recommendation. Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944 (Utah,
1953) .
The divorce court is under no obligation to adhere to an
agreement

between

the

parties,

since

the

distribution

property is a matter within the Court's discretion.

of

Klein v.

Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah, 197 5) .
Mr. Lamano claims that the Court accepted the stipulation
made at Trial.

In fact, the stipulation was to the effect that

there would be a review of a T-Mobile Account, which turned out
not to exist, and if there was value there, there will be credit
placed on the Petitioner's side (Record, p. 1019; April 23, 2004
Tr. at 20:3-7).
On December 9, 2004, Mrs. Lamano's counsel, referring to
the T-Mobile Account, referenced that there would be an off-set,
and if there was another account, and it wasn't the same account
that had been rolled over, they would be happy to give credit as
an off-set (Record, p. 1020; December 9, 2004 Tr. at 55:2-7).
Despite that stipulation or proffer, the Court then stated as
follows:
15

"Well, I guess if the time has passed, then you end up
getting a judgment for the amount of the one-half." (December
9, 2004 Tr. at 55:14-16.)
A few paragraphs later, the Court stated:
"I mean, if you get something within the 45- to 90-day
period that we're contemplating here, then we can readdress it.
Otherwise, if would probably have to be addressed in some sort
of judgment."
(December 9, 2004 Tr. at 56:3-6.)
According to his Exhibit "F" attached to his Opening Brief,
Mr. Lamano did not file a Motion for an evidentiary hearing
regarding the Petitioner's retirement plan until July 15, 2005,
far more than 45 to 90 days from the December 9, 2004 hearing,
and long after Mr. Lamano had already paid virtually all of the
property settlement ordered (Record, p. 927).
Thus, the Court did not accept any stipulations, or such
acceptance was conditional at best.

The conditions were not

met, and the Trial Court was faced with a situation where the
cash property division had already occurred, and a Defined
Benefit Plan needed to be equitably divided.
At the October 31, 2005 hearing the Court stated he never
anticipated a difference in the type of retirement account
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; Tr. October 31,
2005 hearing, p. 45, lines 9-11).
This fact, standing by itself, would be a basis for the
Court to decline to accept a stipulation, even if the Court had
previously

agreed

to

accept

it.

The

Court

retains

the

discretion to change its thinking under the circumstances of
this case.

16

Mr. Lamano argues that the Court assigned a present value
to one of his retirement plans which was a Defined Benefit
Retirement Plan, but neither the Record nor the Brief reflect
any such fact.

The Court was certainly entitled to make an

appropriate decision under the circumstances, which could hardly
be referred to as "reversing course" as characterized by Mr.
Lamano.

II.
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel doesn't apply in this
case, because there was not a prior judicial proceeding.
This was all one case, stretched out over several years.
As the record reflects, there was a Trial in 2004, followed
by a lengthy series of hearings, discussions, and Orders to Show
Cause, all culminating in a Decree, Findings, and Supplemental
Decree of Divorce that finally resolved the case in August of
2006.
To take a series of hearings in the same case and apply the
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel is to distort that doctrine beyond
recognition.
Even if the Court believes that the Doctrine of Judicial
Estoppel applies, the doctrine certainly does not over-ride the
Trial

Court's

duty

in

a

divorce

case

to

exercise

its

jurisdiction to reach an equitable property division, nor does
it over-ride the Court's right to decline acceptance of a
17

stipulation, or revisit a decision once all the facts are known.
This issue was not raised below.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN MAKING
ITS ORDER EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE OF TRIAL.
Appellant claims the Trial Court entered it's order nunc
pro tunc and it was a retroactive order.
The Trial Court's Order has nothing to do with entering a
Decree retroactive or nunc pro tunc.

As noted, the Record

established that a trial occurred, followed by at least two
hearings to resolve issues not fully decided at the Trial with
all final orders signed and entered the same day in August 2006.
The Trial Court divided all property as of the Trial date,
and it was proper to divide the Defined Benefit Pension as of
the same date.

The general rule is that a marital estate is

valued at the time of the Divorce Decree.

(See Rappleye v.

Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1983); Morgan v. Morgan,
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
cases establishes

However, a review of those

that the time of the Divorce Decree is

normally meant to be the time of the Trial or within a short
time following the Trial.

In this particular case, the parties

were actually divorced in December, 2004 (Record, Page 538).
This case was bifurcated, and even though the Decree
entered in August of 2006 purportedly divorces the parties, they
were actually divorced long before that.
18

Mr. Lamano complains that Petitioner's counsel "slipped the
retroactivity

language

into

the

final

version

of

the

Supplemental Divorce Decree", ignoring the fact that counsel
himself was sent a copy of that Decree on or about August 16,
2006, and made no objection thereto.
The Supplemental Decree is not a nunc pro tunc order.

It

was entered the same date as the Decree and the Findings, and
the Decree itself, Paragraph 36, refers to the Supplemental
Decree.

They were part and parcel of the Court's Order on the

same date.
Furthermore,

this

proceedings below.

issue

was

not

raised

during

the

In fact, Appellant's counsel conceded that

the issue of dividing after-discovered retirement plans had been
reserved by the Trial Court for further hearing (Record, p.
1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005, Tr., p. 37,
1-3).

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's decision should be affirmed.

Dividing

the Appellee's Defined Benefit Plan using a formula was entirely
reasonable, fair and equitable under the circumstances, and
completely within the Court's discretion.
DATED this

/z^

day of ^fA?

2007.

jptfTj. BUNDERSON
y^TTORNEY FOR PETITIONER/APPELLEE
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relationship with each other, and historically that has
not occurred.

I guess you can put in language that both

parties will cooperate and leave it very nebulous to
that effect, and that Mr. Lamano will be responsible to
pay all fees in a timely manner, which would perhaps
resolve that issue to that regard.
MR. SMITH:

We would so stipulate.

THE COURT:

Let's give it a try.

MR. BAILEY:
MR. SMITH:
MR. BAILEY:

Okay.

I will add that in.

Thank you.
Now I think we're back on 72.

THE COURT: Anything other than 72, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

I think with respect to the

stipulated items, we're in agreement and that leaves
only 72.
THE COURT: And then you're going to--other
than 72, you're going to make these changes and-MR. BAILEY:

Yeah, and I'll meet with Brad to

make sure we accurately reflect-THE COURT:

Okay.

All right, then.

Let's talk

about the retirement issue.
MR. BAILEY:

The Court will recall at the time

of trial the Court had several retirements in front of
it (inaudible) cash values.
THE COURT: All that could be easily
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liquidated.
MR. BAILEY:

Yeah.

IRAs, KEOGHs, or whatever

they were, they had a cash balance.

And both parties

submitted extensive evidence regarding them.

I went

back and look at my trial binders and Mr. Echard had
subpoenaed Delta regarding retirements.
not receive that.

Apparently did

My client was asked does she have

another retirement and said, "No."

Mr. Lamano testified

he thought she had a retirement with T-Mobile.
And at that point, at the time of trial, we
acknowledged that if there was another retirement, then
he would be entitled to his one-half share.

I think

that finding 72 says they'd have to share it.
We have subsequently been provided by Delta,
through Mr. Echard's subpoena--and I have attached that
--I think Brad has attached it to his motion--an
acknowledgment by letter dated March 23rd of 2005 that
there was a (inaudible)--or a Delta Family-Care
Retirement Plan in existence.
Now, this was way longer than the 3 0 days we
were told we were going to get that information.
that's fine.

I mean, what's fair is fair.

But

And my

client has no problem giving Mr. Lamano his share under
the Woodward decision, because if--and I refer to the
Court a letter from a Chris Collins, Manager Employee
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1

and Service Center, by letter of March 17th of x05,

2

indicating that there is a defined-benefit plan that the

3

company is the sole one who contributes to, that the

4

employee cannot contribute to.

5

think to be the portion (inaudible).

6

THE COURT:

Is this something we should just

7

accept as a piece of evidence?

8

MR. BAILEY:

9

MR. SMITH:

Well, they have.
Yeah.

10

says what it says, yeah.

11

Court receiving it.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BAILEY:

14

THE COURT: Oh.

15

MR. BAILEY:

16

MR. SMITH:

17

I accept that the letter

We have no objection to the

(Inaudible) with a sticker on it?
It's probably my only copy.

But it's in my reply.
It's in--it's before the Court in

the pleadings relating to--

18
19

And if I may read what I

THE COURT:

Go ahead and just read, then,

what--

20

MR. BAILEY:

If I may read it.

21

THE COURT: Yeah.

22

MR. BAILEY:

And we have no trouble...

It is

23

entitled "Pamela Lamano has met the 100 percent vesting

24

requirements (completion of five years' accredited

25

service) under the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan (a

25

1

defined-benefit pension plan).

2

benefit calculation, benefit accruals include total

3

participation in the plan from the Delta seniority date

4

of August 5, 1987 through February 28 of 2005," which is

5

probably in conjunction with the subpoena.

6

For purposes of this

"It is assumed that the single-life annuity

7

payments are to be made for the participant's lifetime

8

only.

9

2019 is in the amount of $727.29.

The monthly benefit payable at 65 on October 1,
Delta Airlines does

10

not compute the 'present value7 or the 'marital portion'

11

of a retirement benefit from the plan.

12

defined-benefit plan which is entirely employer funded

13

and neither requires nor allows employee contributions.

The plan is a

14

"Any 'present value' or 'marital portion' would

15

have to be determined through an outside source, such as

16

a pension actuary.

17

plan description, administrative procedures for

18

processing domestic relation orders and our model

19

order."

20

Enclosed is a copy of the summary

And then, "If you have any questions."
I guess the argument comes down to this, Your

21

Honor.

If that plan would have been discussed at the

22

time of trial as a defined-benefit plan, categorically

23

and historically defined-benefit plans have been divided

24

under Woodward,

25

if it's difficult, if you have to assume too much, then

the Supreme Court decision saying that

26

1

the simple way and the most appropriate way to handle it

2

is through filing a (inaudible).

3

Mr. Lamano would have received his share under

4

Woodward.

5

fact that in Mr. Lamano's request he has utilized an

6

actuary to go back and calculate what his entitlement

7

would be based upon, as I recall, $73 7 during the period

8

of time that he and Ms. Lamano were married in which she

9

was employed at Delta.

Where we have fundamental differences is the

10

THE COURT:

11

February 28, 2005--

12

MR. BAILEY:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BAILEY:

Well, wasn't that amount based on a

No.
--end date?
No.

Because what you have to do

15

is--if you look at it is the monthly benefit payable at

16

65 on October 1, 2019 is in the amount of $727.29.

17
18
19

THE COURT:

Yeah, but wasn't that based o n —

wasn't the $727 based on a February 2005 date?
MR. BAILEY:

No.

For the--it says for the

20

purposes--well, the benefit calculation--benefit

21

accruals include total participation in the plan from

22

the Delta seniority date of August 5th through--of '87

23

through February 28th of 2005.

24
25

It is assumed that the single-life annuity
payments are to be made for the participant's lifetime
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only.

The monthly benefit payable at 65 on October 1st

is $727.29.

That's if she retires in the year 2019,

that's the amount she would get based upon the plan at
that point.

That's what she--

THE COURT:

So it has no regard--no relation to

February of 2005?
MR. BAILEY:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BAILEY:
THE COURT:
MR. BAILEY:

(Inaudible.)

What they're saying is-Go ahead.
--the retirement that he would be

entitled to receive is no different than he would be
entitled than that, had we defined it or identified it
on the date we filed.
I think to go back, have an actuary compute the
$727 or the figure that is used in Mr. Lamano's motion
and creating a claim for an offset isn't consistent with
the Woodward decision; isn't consistent with what this
Court would do and has done in the past.

And he has not

shown where he has been prejudiced by anything by
retaining his share.
THE COURT:
MR. BAILEY:
THE COURT:
off.

As the letter says, file the QDRO.
Let me ask you this, Mr. Bailey.
Sure.
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to cut you

I perceive a big part of the reason I divided

28

1

retirement up on the date of trial was I was able to,

2

the hard numbers were in front of me.

3

seemed to be advisable to do that in light of the

4

animosity that existed between the parties, to split

5

things up as much as possible.

6

you recall why I did that at that point in time?

7

MR. BAILEY:

And also, it

Was there another reason

That was the only information that

8

the Court had, were plans that had calculable amounts of

9

money in them.

10

divide it.

It's easy, if there were $28,335, to

This is not that type of plan.

11

Now, the Court, as I recall, in that decision

12

left open, based upon the facts that were before it at

13

the time, or language to that effect--

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BAILEY:

Very limited facts.
Yeah.

Nobody knew, and despite

16

allegations or assertions that my client was trying to

17

hide anything--if she was called to testify, she would

18

say, I didn't know anything about it.

19

contributions.

20

plan (inaudible) are not a union, so it's not a union-

21

type of information.

22

I don't make any

The Delta stewardesses or--in which this

She didn't realize she had it.

And I would tell the Court that I've looked at

23

her payroll records.

I wouldn't have picked it up

24

either.

25

is entitled to his Woodward share, and I think that's

But he is entitled to his retirement share.

He
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1

appropriate.

2
3

THE COURT:
me on this one.

4
5

Let me allow Mr. Smith to address

MR. SMITH:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll try to

be brief and (inaudible) .

6

The Court's specific ruling in this case on

7

April the 23rd was, "I think it will be healthiest for

8

both parties if we split"--off is what I think you

9

meant.

It says "of" in the transcript--"so that"--

10

THE COURT:

What page are--what page are you

12

MR. SMITH:

Page 19, line 17--18 through 23.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. SMITH:

u

11

on?

Thank you.

If we split off the retirement, as

15

opposed to ordering the Woodward share, to the extent we

16

have knowledge and ability to do that."

17

THE COURT:

Well--

18

MR. SMITH:

Based on that ruling, Mr. Bailey

19

has prepared findings that reference this in paragraph

20

72, specifically saying that if there's something out

21

there Mr. Lamano would be entitled to a one-half

22

interest.

23

At this point, Mr. Lamano is concerned because

24

this is an issue that he has diligently attempted to get

25

information from Ms. Lamano on.

Early on in this case,
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1

in 2000--2001, Ms. Lamano answered interrogatories in

2

which she said there is just the 401(k)-type retirement,

3

nothing else.

4

retirement you have it seems reasonable that it's

5

incumbent on you to make a reasonable inquiry.

6

inquiry into the terms of her employment would indicate

7

that there was such a retirement out there.

8
9

In fairness, when you're asked what

An

As we sit here today, there is another paper
that's in front of the Court.

Mr. Bailey has read to

10

you from Chris Collins7 letter indicating that Delta

11

does not compute present value or the marital portion.

12

Mr. Lamano has retained the services of an actuary who

13

has made that computation--and that is in front of you

14

as part of our July 18, 2005 submission--in which he

15

values it at $100,326.

16

THE COURT:

But you'll agree that's not

17

admissible in its current form.

To the extent you want

18

to get that in front of me, there would have to be an

19

evidentiary hearing.

20

MR. SMITH:

There would be, Judge.

21

THE COURT:

Because everything there is

MR. SMITH:

Well, it's hearsay that probably

22
23

hearsay.

24

comes in by virtue of an expert testimony.

But I would

25

agree with you; we would have to qualify the individual
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1

and--

2

THE COURT:

In its current form.

3

MR. SMITH:

--lay the foundation.

4
5

I would

agree with that.
And so my point here, though, is really there's

6

two issues.

We are clearly in agreement on the first

7

and threshold issue.

8

always been in agreement on this issue, as recently as

9

May the assertion was this account doesn't exist.

There is no--although we have not

10

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

11

MR. SMITH:

And so now we are clearly in

12

agreement that there is a defined-benefit plan that

13

Ms. Lamano is the beneficiary of and that is appropriate

14

for division as a marital asset.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

16

MR. SMITH:

That then takes us to the second

17

step, which is how.

18

simply this:

19

we're going to apply a Woodward formula.

20

we've done is--although we don't yet have a final order,

21

Mr. Lamano has gone ahead and performed his obligations

22

under what will be the final order to the tune of a

23

little more than a hundred thousand dollars, which

24

included compensating Ms. Lamano for the differential in

25

the cash-type retirement accounts they have.

At this point, our position is

It's fundamentally unfair to say, Well,
Because what

32

1
2

Was that a hundred thousand

MR. SMITH:

It included that.

dollars?

3
4

THE COURT:

It was--I

believe the retirement balancing portion of that--

5

THE COURT:

But there were a lot of other

7

MR. SMITH:

Correct.

8

THE COURT: And so the retirement wasn't a

6

9

things.
Correct.

hundred thousand?

10

MR. SMITH:

The retirement was not a hundred

11

thousand.

I believe it was some--I want to say $17,000

12

or $18,000 of the hundred.

13

been paid for that.

14

THE COURT:

She's been paid the $18,000?

15

MR. SMITH:

Right, and--

16

THE COURT:

Short a little bit that is still--

17

MR. SMITH:

Short a little bit, about $4,000.

My point is, however, she's

18

But it amounts to something a little more than a hundred

19

grand.

20

The Court made a ruling, as you've indicated,

21

based on the best facts you had in front of you at the

22

time.

23

known better.

24

before in the December 23rd--or the December 9th hearing

25

that the Court held, the express representation was that

Our position is Ms. Lamano could and should have
And, in fact, when this was brought up

33

if there is an account out there, it will be credited as
an offset.
At this point there is some unfairness, both
procedural and substantive, in saying, Well, yeah, now
that you've proven there's an account, now we'll change
horses and say this one asset we're going to apply the
Woodward division.
One last point, Your Honor, and then-THE COURT:
you move on.

Let me address you on that before

The reason I was able to divide the

$36,000 to get the $18,000 was because there was a cash
value that was readily available-MR. SMITH:

They were 401(k) accounts.

THE COURT:

--and easy to determine.

There

were no assumptions that the Court needed to make
whatsoever.

And the thought was to the extent we can

divide things, since there's so much acrimony, it is
best for both parties to divide as much as we can.
This retirement plan is not easily divisible.
There are assumptions that your--though I'm saying it's
not admissible, I've certainly looked at it.

There are

assumptions that he had to make to arrive at a presentvalue figure that he arrived--that he arrived at.
MR. SMITH:

Sure.

THE COURT:

I think the $727 is inaccurate.

34

1

What do you think?

2

MR. SMITH:

On the $727, as I read the letter

3

all I can say is what I take from that, which is $727

4

represents the amount Ms. Lamano would receive at

5

retirement in 2 019 if her employment stopped as of

6

February 2005.

7

read the letter.

8
9

That's--all I can say is that's how I

THE COURT:

That causes me some concerns

(inaudible).

10

MR. SMITH:

I think that--and I think that goes

11

directly to the concerns, Your Honor.

12

making a determination as to how to treat this asset,

13

you may not have sufficient facts.

14

record you have to simply say, Well,

15

automatically applies, in my mind it would not be fair

16

either.
Woodward,

17

At this point

And based on the
Woodward

you'll recall, involved two separate

The first issue in Woodward was whether this

18

issues.

19

type of defined-benefit retirement account was a marital

20

asset at all.

21

do you divide it up?

22

says you must divide it up by some sort of deferred

23

division.

24
25

The second issue was how--if it is, how
There's nothing in Woodward that

In fact, subsequent case law suggests that one
of the criteria you would use in making the
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1

determination to have an immediate division is the

2

acrimony of the parties, so that we're not having some

3

proceeding in 2 019 to figure out what to do.

4

THE COURT:

But the other variables--but the

5

other considerations are the ability to be accurate in

6

your immediate division.

7

MR. SMITH:

And that is certainly true, Judge.

8

And the question is:

9

affairs, can an actuary provide testimony to the Court,

10

to a reasonable degree of actuarial certainty, whatever

11

that might mean, that would give the Court a basis to do

12

that?

13

there's no record before you that allows us to reach

14

that point, for sure.

15

Based on the current state of

To say that there's no way to do it today,

There's nothing before the Court to say that

16

this asset is intrinsically incalculable.

17

the extent that the letter might--from my actuary might

18

mean anything, it suggests that it can be calculated.

19

In fact, to

THE COURT:

So you would like to reopen the

21

MR. SMITH:

Well, and on this--

22

THE COURT:

--to--

23

MR. SMITH:

I'm sorry.

24

THE COURT:

I'm just trying to understand where

20

25

trial--

you're going, so let me allow you to tell me.
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MR. SMITH:

I think we--I'm not asking to

reopen the trial, because my understanding is this
particular issue has always been sort of held open.
But, yes, I think--in order to deal with this asset
fairly, I think you--you're going to have to take some
supplemental evidence and have some supplemental
findings.
I certainly do not want to be heard to say,
u

Don't enter these findings while we sort out this

issue."

These findings preserve this issue, but yes I

think before you can say this is an incalculable asset
there is additional evidence that has to be in front of
the Court.
THE COURT:

But wouldn't you agree I don't have

to say it's an incalculable asset?

I could find that I

have concerns about the variables to the extent that I
determine the fairest way would simply be to use
Woodward.
MR. SMITH:
Honor.
that.

If I may speak very directly, Your

I certainly believe you have the ability to say
Based on the record before you, I believe it

would be an abuse of discretion to do so.
THE COURT:

Oh, because I divided up things

that were absolute amounts that could easily be divided?
There were no variables on any of the other retirement
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plans.
MR. SMITH:

And that may be, Your Honor.

On

this particular account, even the existence of the
variables is an assumption we're making, not a fact.
THE COURT:

Discount rate's got to be a

MR. SMITH:

Sure.

variable.

absolutely true.

Is that a--yeah, that's

That's certainly not a variable that

the courts--the appeals courts have considered as one
which would preclude a present-valuation calculation.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SMITH:

I mean, in Woodward—if

briefly address--in Woodward--one
example, in Woodward

I can just

of the variables, for

itself, was the individual had a

long-time--10 or 15 years to work before retirement and
there was a question of if he worked through a certain
period of time--it was a federal civil service
retirement of some sort--there was an amount the
government would match, if he worked the entire period
of time.
That was a variable that was out there.

And

the Court said, Based on that, maybe you shouldn't have
an immediate valuation.

But one of the other variables

was ability to satisfy it.
THE COURT:

How about the bankruptcy of Delta
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Airlines?
MR. SMITH:

I don't know that we--I certainly

believe the Court can take judicial notice of the fact
that Delta Airlines has filed bankruptcy.

What, if any,

the effect of that is on their retirement plan, or on
the presently vested portion of a retirement plan, I
have no idea.
THE COURT:

You're going to present that

evidence, though?
MR. SMITH:

I think I would be obligated to,

MR. BAILEY:

I would get to the point, Your

yes.

Honor, at the time of trial if the Court was aware that
this was a defined-benefit plan, the appropriate mode at
that point would be, one, give to Mr. Lamano, which he's
entitled to receive, his Woodward
all of the assumptions.
variables.

share.

That takes out

It takes out all of the

What it is is what it is.

What he hasn't said today is how he is unfairly
treated.

He gets the same interest he would have

received in April of 20 04 right now; nothing more,
nothing less.
THE COURT:
with you, Mr. Bailey.

Well--I mean, I--I tend to agree
Part of me is inclined to let

them try to prove otherwise.

I think it's an uphill
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1

battle, Mr. Smith.

And, of course, the attorney's fees

2

would have to be left open.

Do you want to do a —

3

MR. SMITH:

Those are my instructions.

4

THE COURT:

Well, let's get everything else

5

down and I'll set an evidentiary hearing for you.

6

long do you want?

7

MR. SMITH:

How

I would think we could put on our

8

portion of the matter in a couple of hours, so I would

9

say half a day.

10
11

MR. BAILEY:

Well, again, I'm opposed to that,

Your Honor--

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BAILEY:

I know you are.
--for the same reason that we're

14

going over it.

15

retirement.

16

my client makes no contribution.

17

it been here on--in April, you would have done the same

18

thing that you would have done, and that is give him the

19

Woodward share of this retirement.

20

Court not to prolong this case.

21

(inaudible).

22
23
24
25

Again, this is not a monetary

This is a fixed defined-benefit plan that

THE COURT:

And had the Court--had

And I'm asking the

This case is an

Well, we're going to have

everything else done, because-MR. BAILEY:

Well, (inaudible) in April of 2 0 04

and again we're going over the same amount of problems
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1

that we had, assumptions, assumptions, assumptions.

2

that's exactly what Woodward addressed, was you take out

3

the assumptions on any defined-benefit plan.

4

different than the federal civil service that my friend

5

Mr. Smith referred to in Woodward--and

6

Woodward case — or what this Court would receive.

7

defined-benefit plan.

8
9

THE COURT:

I had the second
It's a

So you're saying that even if I

MR. BAILEY:

It's still an assumption and a

guess and--

12
13

No

heard the testimony from their expert--

10
11

And

THE COURT:

He would have to make an assumption

on the discount rate, you agree with that?

14

MR. SMITH:

I wouldn't use the word

15

"assumption," but I know what you mean.

16

would have to--he would have to pick one and be able to

17

justify it, yes.

18
19

THE COURT:
word.

And, yes, he

Well, okay, maybe that isn't a good

He would have to —

20

MR. LAMANO:

21

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sure.

22

THE COURT:

It's a variable that different

23

(Inaudible.)

experts could vary on.

24

MR. SMITH:

You bet.

25

THE COURT:

And then there would have to be an
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1

opinion with regard to Delta's stability.

2

they would--they would have to present that, Mr. Bailey,

3

to show--

4

MR. BAILEY:

5

THE COURT:

6

Of course,

Well, I guess---that it would be the same

regardless of what happened to the company.

7

MR. BAILEY:

What I had--my feeling is--on

8

this, Your Honor, is again I've been before this Court

9

on other divorce cases with defined-benefit plans and

10

the--

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BAILEY:

I agree.
--Court has been very consistent

13

with it.

If Mr. Lamano doesn't like it, his recourse is

14

to the Court of Appeals.

15

that's his decision.

16

he gets his Woodward share.

17

$4,000 in fees and costs and the likelihood of his

18

ability to show that there is a set amount is very

19

difficult, not to mention creating a lot of problems now

20

trying to go back through and offset actions that took a

21

year-and-a-half (inaudible).

22

THE COURT:

And if he wants to do that,

But I think it's appropriate that
We're now talking another

Well, and I've expressed if he's

23

unable to show that, then there would be attorney's

24

fees.

25

MR. BAILEY:

Well, and I understand that, but
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what you're saying is--let's say for argument's sake
that he is--somewhere his guy comes up with what the
figure was he had, 53,000 bucks.

Well, that now has

created its own dilemma in renegotiating property issues
involving these two parties.
THE COURT:

You're saying even at that point in

time Woodward would be appropriate because of where we
are today?
MR. BAILEY:
THE COURT:

That's right.
Okay.

Let me allow you to address

me on that one, Mr. Smith.
MR. SMITH:

Very briefly, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Sitting as a court of equity.

MR. SMITH:

Sitting as a court of equity, you

may very well already have reached the point where,
irrespective of my ability or inability to establish the
factors we've been speaking about, you would still feel
it appropriate to apply the Woodward

formula.

I would

not agree that that was appropriate, but I would agree
that that's within the Court's discretion to do.
And I certainly would recognize that if
Mr. Lamano disagrees with that, as Mr. Bailey says, his
recourse is to the Court of Appeals.

And if that's

where we're at, I suppose efficiency would dictate that
you make that finding.
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1

Having said that, three points.

Number one, as

2

a court of equity, I believe that it's--it's as I've

3

indicated, fundamentally unfair to allow a party to

\

either knowingly or unknowingly--I'm not making that

)

value judgment.

But to have failed to reveal

information clearly within their ability to control,
allow a state of affairs to be created, represent to the
Court if such and such a thing happens we're still going
to allow it as an offset, and allow things to progress,
and then when the facts turn out to be different than
you have been wagering all along then to say, Oh, well,
if you had known about this back at trial you surely
would have done it this way--I recognize what you're
saying, that the retirement assets in front of you at
trial were more easily calculable.
THE COURT:

Well, what you're saying there is

you want to punish the Petitioner for her lack of
diligence, or whatever you want to call it.

Isn't there

another way to do that besides what you're suggesting?
MR. SMITH:

The Court certainly has a whole

range of options to do that.

We need--one way of doing

it, Judge, is--as we've indicated, when you've taken a
position in court, then you're stuck with it.
THE COURT:

Well, but you understand that

position wasn't made with the knowledge that this was a
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defined-benefit plan.
MR. SMITH:

No, I don't agree with that, Judge.

By the time we got-THE COURT:

Well, I'm telling you then.

MR. SMITH:

Well, I realize that was your

THE COURT:

From my point of view--

MR. SMITH:

Sure.

THE COURT:

--I had no understanding that this

position.

I--

was a defined-benefit plan or that--that there even was
a plan.
MR. SMITH:

And I apologize (inaudible).

THE COURT:

If I had known it was a defined-

benef it plan, I wouldn't have made that statement.
MR. SMITH:

And I'm sorry, I've been unclear in

what I'm referring to.
THE COURT:

Well, that's okay.

MR. SMITH:

Ms. Lamano, is what I'm referring

to, in the December hearing took the position if there
is this amount out there, it will be applied as an
offset.

And at that point everybody's saying it's some

sort of retirement account not of the 401(k) or cash
contribution variety.

We've now progressed and that's

where we're at.
And in all fairness, my client's frustration is
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this:

He's had to refinance.

He's had to come up with

the money, all of the money that he was required to.
And he--his comment to me I think is appropriate to
quote to the Court.

If it's good for the goose, it's

got to be good for the gander.
And we started off in one position and we're
kind of in this bind because Ms. Lamano represented a
certain set of facts to the Court and decisions were
made based on that set of facts.

And now, as it turns

out, they're of a different variety.

And on this

particular issue, of a type that the Court has no choice
but to deal with.
THE COURT:

Is it of any consequence that of

that only approximately two-tenths was related to this
retirement?
MR. SMITH:

I think that is a relevant fact,

and I'm not trying to suggest otherwise.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. SMITH:

Based on--

THE COURT:

You wanted to tell me some other

things, though.
MR. SMITH:

I think that covers it, Judge.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. SMITH:

I'll submit the matter on that

basis.
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THE COURT:

All right.

Sitting as--two things.

Sitting as a court of equity, given the case where it is
today, to the extent you want to bring a motion for
contempt relating to her discovery violations, I will
consider that separately.
I'm going to order the Woodward
think Mr. Bailey is exactly right.

formula.

I

If it had been

presented to me at the time of trial with regard to this
unique retirement account, that's what I would have
ordered, because it wasn't easily divisible at that
point in time based on assumptions--variables that would
have to be filled in.
I understand--let me also say this, though.

I

understand that--well, contempt is a separate issue that
you can bring, if you wish to.

I understand there has

been time, effort and attorney's fees involved in
pursuing the finding and then bringing it to the Court's
attention, this account.
There has also been a fair amount of time spent
by Mr. Bailey in responding to the objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that
were submitted back in February of 2005 by Respondent.
Since that time, through discussions,
Respondent has withdrawn at least seven of those
objections, after having found that there actually was a
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record made of the January 13, 2005 telephone
conference.

To Respondent's credit, the other matters

that we've worked through were matters we did need to
work through.

But there were seven objections made in

that initial filing in February of 2005 that have since
been summarily withdrawn that Mr. Bailey didn't have to
take the time to respond to, but he did.
Again, sitting as a court of equity, I--he has
requested attorney's fees for the time and effort he has
put in.

I'm going to offset those fees with the fees

that counsel has had to incur in pursuing this
retirement issue.
That will be the order of the Court.
Are there any other issues I haven't addressed,
Counsel?
MR. BAILEY:

No, Your Honor.

findings and submit them to Mr. Smith.

I'll prepare the
If we need to,

I'm happy to get together with Brad.
MR. SMITH:

Very well.

THE COURT:

All right.

If you have any

questions--let me--and I think I offered this before-get Leila on the phone, get me on the phone with the two
of you, let's try to get them talked through and
resolved as quickly as possible.
MR. BAILEY:

We will.

In fact, I'll try and
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1

h a v e a c o p y of t h i s t o B r a d by t h i s

week.

2

MR. SMITH:

Very w e l l .

3

THE COURT:

All r i g h t .

4

(The h e a r i n g was c o n c l u d e d . )

5

•k

k

k

6

ic

k

k

7

k

ic

k

8

*

k

k

9

*

*

k

0

ic

ic

k

1

ic

ic

ic

2

ic

ic

ic

3

ic

ic

k

4

ic

ic

ic

5

ic

ic

-k

6

ic

ic

k

17

-k

ic

ic

18

ic

k

ic

19

•k

-k

-k

>0

ic

ic

k

21

ic

ic

k

22

ic

ic

k

23

ic

ic

k

24

-k

*

*

*

*

*

25

Thank y o u , C o u n s e l .
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